The Pentagon’s domestic battle for control of new cyber forces – NBC Connecticut

• In September, the Pentagon formally asked lawmakers in Congress to reject the proposal to create an independent US Cyber ​​Force.
• Proponents of the plan say a dedicated cyber unit would streamline operations and strengthen the country’s ability to counter growing threats from adversaries such as China and Russia.
• President-elect Donald Trump released a sweeping national cybersecurity plan during his first term in 2018 that gave the Department of Homeland Security many powers but also included key Department of Defense functions related to national security and geopolitics.

The recent Chinese cyber espionage attack on the country’s major telecommunications networks, which may have reached the level of reports by President-elect Donald Trump and Vice President-elect J.D. Vance, was called this week by one US senator “by far the most serious telecommunications hack in our history.”

The US has yet to discover the full extent of what China has achieved and whether its spies are inside US communications networks.

“The barn door is still wide open, or nearly so,” Virginia Sen. Mark Warner, chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, told the New York Times on Thursday.

The revelations highlight growing cyber threats related to geopolitics and U.S. nation-state competitors, but there is disagreement within the federal government over how to fight back, with some advocates calling for an independent U.S. federal cyber force. In September, the Defense Department formally addressed Congress, urging lawmakers to reject this approach.

One of the most prominent voices advocating for a new branch is the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, a national security think tank, but the issue extends far beyond any one group. In June, the defense committees in both the House and Senate approved measures calling for an independent assessment of the feasibility of creating a separate cyber department as part of the annual defense policy debate.

Based on the views of more than 75 active and retired officers with experience in cyber operations, FDD’s 40-page report highlights what it says are chronic structural problems at U.S. Cyber ​​Command (CYBERCOM), including fragmented recruiting and training practices across all commands. Army, Navy, Air Force and Marines.

“The U.S. cyber force generation system is clearly broken,” FDD wrote, citing comments made in 2023 by then-chief of U.S. Cyber ​​Command Army Gen. Paul Nakasone, who assumed the role in 2018 and called the current U.S. military cyber organization unsustainable. : “All options other than the status quo are on the table,” Nakasone said.

Concerns about Congress and a changing White House

The FCA’s analysis points to the “deep concerns” that have existed in Congress for a decade (among members of both parties) about the military’s ability to successfully defend cyberspace. Talent shortages, inconsistent training and misaligned missions undermine CYBERCOM’s ability to effectively respond to complex cyber threats, the report says. Supporters argue that the creation of a special unit will improve the US posture in cyberspace. The Pentagon, however, warns that such a move could disrupt coordination, increase fragmentation and ultimately weaken U.S. cyber readiness.

As the Pentagon increases resistance to creating a separate U.S. cyber force, the new Trump administration could play a significant role in determining whether America leans toward a centralized cyber strategy or strengthens the current integrated structure that emphasizes cross-sector coordination.

Trump’s 2018 National Cyber ​​Strategy, known for its sweeping national security measures, emphasized embedding cyber capabilities across all elements of the nation’s government and focusing on interagency coordination and public-private partnerships rather than creating a separate cyber organization. At the time, the Trump administration emphasized centralizing civilian cybersecurity efforts within the Department of Homeland Security while directing the Department of Defense to combat more sophisticated defense-specific cyber threats. South Dakota Gov. Kristi Noem, Trump’s pick for Homeland Security secretary, spoke about her and her state’s focus on cybersecurity.

Former Trump officials believe a second Trump administration will take an aggressive stance on national security issues, fill gaps at the Energy Department and reduce regulatory burdens on the private sector. They expect greater attention to offensive cyber operations, individual defense against vulnerabilities and increased coordination among state and local governments. The changes will come at the leadership of the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, which was created during Trump’s first term and whose current director, Jen Easterly, announced she would leave after Trump’s inauguration.

Cyber ​​Command 2.0 and the US Army

John Cohen, executive director of the Center for Internet Security’s Hybrid Threat Program, is among those who share the Pentagon’s concerns. “We can no longer afford to operate in silos,” Cohen said, warning that a separate cyber branch could worsen existing silos and further isolate cyber operations from other important military efforts.

Cohen emphasized that adversaries such as China and Russia use cyber tactics as part of broader, integrated strategies that include economic, physical and psychological components. To counter such threats, the United States needs a cohesive approach across its armed forces, he said. “Countering this requires our armed forces to consistently adapt to the changing battlespace,” he said.

In 2018, CYBERCOM certified its Cyber ​​Mission Force teams as fully staffed, but FDD and others raised concerns that personnel were being moved between teams to achieve personnel goals—a move they said masked deeper structural problems. Nakasone called for CYBERCOM 2.0, saying in comments earlier this year: “How do we think about learning differently? How do we think about people differently?” and adding that a major problem is the approach to staffing within the command.

Austin Berglas, a former head of the FBI’s cyber program in New York who has worked on consolidation within the Bureau, said separate cyber units could expand U.S. capabilities by centralizing resources and priorities. “When I first took over the (FBI) cyber program… the assets were scattered,” said Berglas, who is now global head of professional services at supply chain cyber defense company BlueVoyant. He said centralization has brought focus and efficiency to the FBI’s cyber efforts, a model he believes will also benefit the war effort in cyberspace. “Cyber ​​is a different matter,” Berglas said, emphasizing the need for specialized training, promotions and resource allocation that are not diluted by competing military priorities.

Berglas also pointed to the ongoing “cyber arms race” with adversaries such as China, Russia, Iran and North Korea. He warned that without special forces, the United States risks falling behind as countries expand their offensive cyber capabilities and exploit vulnerabilities in critical infrastructure.

Nakasone said in comments earlier this year that much has changed since 2013, when U.S. Cyber ​​Command began building its Cyber ​​Missions to combat issues such as counter-terrorism and financial cybercrime emanating from Iran. “It’s a completely different world that we live in today,” he said, citing threats from China and Russia.

Brandon Wales, former executive director of CISA, said there is a need to strengthen U.S. cyber capabilities, but he cautioned against major structural changes at a time of escalating global threats.

“A reorganization of this magnitude would obviously be disruptive and take time,” said Wales, who is now vice president of cybersecurity strategy at SentinelOne.

He cited China’s preparations for a potential conflict over Taiwan as a reason the U.S. military needs to maintain readiness. Instead of creating a new unit, Wales supports initiatives such as Cyber ​​Command 2.0 and its aim to improve coordination and capabilities within the existing structure. “Major reorganizations should always be a last resort because they are disruptive,” he said.

Wales says it is important to ensure that any structural changes do not undermine integration between military branches and recognize that coordination among existing military branches is critical to countering the complex, multifaceted threats posed by U.S. adversaries. “You shouldn’t always assume that centralization will solve all your problems,” he said. “We need to expand our capabilities, both defensively and offensively. It’s not about one solution; it’s about ensuring we can quickly see, stop, disrupt and prevent threats from reaching our critical infrastructure and systems,” he added.