Why a negotiated end to the war in Ukraine is now difficult – Firstpost

If, after Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s surprise visit to meet him in the war-torn country in August, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky thought he could persuade Indian politicians to side with him on the Russian front, he would be on to something. This is not just about India’s long-standing ties and friendship with Moscow, which most Indians, starting with the masses, still consider more reliable geopolitically and geostrategically than any other international ties, including ties with the only superpower, the United States. which has begun to face some difficulties in recent weeks.

Prime Minister Modi was back in Moscow last month for the BRICS summit, where he also discussed the war on the sidelines with host President Vladimir Putin. Closer to home, his meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping diverted all attention from the Modi-Putin talks and even from major developments and results on the BRICS front. It is enough to note that the BRICS member states should not rush to admit new members. ad infinitum or introduce a single currency that could replace the US dollar as the international currency. If they are goal-oriented, they should strategize even more regarding the last time, especially. After all, every second country must earn the dollar, which is now the most popular international currency. Simply put, the US only needs to print it.

Beyond BRICS, Zelensky has since repeated his call for India to intervene in the peace process, but on the side of Ukraine. The basic premise in diplomatic matters is that you cannot mediate or mediate in such situations and still take sides. But Kyiv insists that all those who want to play a constructive role in ending the war, which Ukrainians also want to end, must support Zelensky’s commitment to his country – while condemning Russia and Putin.

It is clear that India would not succumb to Zelensky’s idea even with its eyes closed. Yes, India can hold bilateral negotiations between Ukraine and Russia. She doesn’t even need to be a mediator, she just needs to facilitate. But even for this, stakeholders must do their part. On the Russian side, Moscow will have to confirm that it will withdraw from the occupied Ukrainian territories as soon as other concerns are satisfied. The question is whether these territories should end up being those that Russia “occupied” (or “liberated”) in the war that began in February 2022. Or, if Crimea, occupied by Russia in 2014, is also included, this will become a subtext.

Mutual concerns

Enough has been written about how the United States has avoided responding to Putin’s demand that NATO not expand to Russia’s borders since the late nineties. Outside of the West, especially the US, there was general agreement that admitting Ukraine to NATO would provoke Russia. The more Russia reacted by, say, “annexing” Crimea, the more unclear the reason for the United States to accept Ukraine into the arms of NATO became. Yes, Ukraine also sincerely feared Russia’s annexation of the country or its border provinces, at least over time. But the greater the likelihood of Ukraine’s early admission to NATO, the faster Russia responded.

Earlier, in 2008, when Putin swapped the presidency with Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev (if bypassing the constitutional provision), Russia “recognized” Abkhazia and South Ossetia within Georgia as independent entities, established diplomatic relations with them, and also hosted Russian troops for their safety. Will this “occupation” by Russia be part of the overall agenda that the West will set for any Russian-Ukrainian negotiations to end the ongoing war? This is a million-dollar question that neither India nor any other mediator in the world would like to consider, especially at this preliminary stage.

Otherwise, the long list of countries that participated in the Ukrainian peace effort also supports Zelensky’s position, which is not a position if the idea is to make a negotiated peace with Russia. The fact is that neither Ukraine nor its Western backers, especially the United States, want to accept (or want to be perceived as accepting) that Russia’s demand can have any justification. Another thing is that neither side is ready to declare its desire to return to pre-war positions if their legitimate demands are met and cannot be ignored.

Stepmother treatment

Today, Russia’s demands have become more lengthy compared to Ukraine’s one-point demand for the withdrawal of its troops to pre-war positions. Yes, Kyiv will also demand ironclad guarantees that Moscow will not abandon its obligations in the future. Then NATO membership becomes the raison d’être for Ukraine and its Western allies, and the United States in particular. It was here that the present war began; they will be reluctant to concede, and talks about opening negotiations on the issue remain distant, at least for now.

We can also expect Russia to demand that the US-led West lift all sanctions imposed since the start of the war in Ukraine and return to the days of the Georgian and Crimean episodes. It is fair to expect that the sanctions imposed since the start of the war in Ukraine will become an acceptable requirement if Russia also withdraws from the occupied territories, but other sanctions and their withdrawal may be linked to similar troop withdrawals elsewhere. Is Russia ready for all this?

This question is serious in design and content, since Moscow in general and President Putin in particular would have to explain a lot to its people who survived the war if Russia withdrew from the territories that it or annexed as its own territories. or recognized as an independent legal entity. Any power wishing to undermine Putin’s post-peace leadership would expect internal opposition to any such initiative from their government, especially after they have endured such hardship. Likewise, in territories under Russian control or tutelage, the local population would be reluctant to return to the post-Soviet “womb,” where they might fear stepmother treatment or worse.

Last but not least on this list is the International Criminal Court’s “arrest warrant” against President Putin, calling him a “war criminal.” This once again proves that in the international arena of politics and diplomacy, might (albeit in quantitative terms) is right. For the war to end, as well as other sanctions, Russia would like to see this warrant against Putin revoked, preferably with retrospective effect. Whether it is thus reversed or not, such a course would make the post-Cold War global order an even greater mockery than it already is.

Essentially, both sides have resorted to inevitable steps that they would find difficult to reverse without losing face, both close to home and away, and without playing with global systems that are already being ridiculed by Israel and, previously, the United States. . If, at the height of the Iraq War, the US told the UN Security Council and the UN General Assembly that Saddam Hussein had weapons of mass destruction (WMD) that no one had ever recovered, the Israeli ban on Secretary General Guterres and attacks on UN peacekeepers brought irreparable shame to international institutions for all time. From here the UN can only weaken further and further. This is not done to protect other offenders, but to point out the impossibility of the current situation, which can only get worse.

Non-interference

The real question for any peacemaker in these circumstances is whether the United States, in particular, will guarantee non-interference in the process, directly or otherwise, thereby torpedoing the initiative now and forever. Ultimately, this has become a “proxy war” in which Ukraine is fighting two battles simultaneously: one defending itself against Russia, and the other fighting a “proxy war” for the US and the rest of the West. Behind their supposed altruism is a desire to see Russia capable militarily, economically and, hopefully, politically.

Would India, as a peacemaker, want to see such a turn of events and subsequently blame itself for allowing its long-time friend and past ally to deplete itself to a level that even the split of the Soviet Union did not cause? Recent developments on the US-Canadian front regarding issues related to Khalistani terrorism have exposed, in particular, gaps in India’s bilateral relations with America. This may be less so in the case of the political leadership and even the national diplomatic and strategic community, but on the streets of India, a mental equation has once again emerged between dependence on Moscow and its absence in the case of Washington. No government in Delhi can ignore such issues and considerations in the short to medium term.

Western corporations have lined their pockets with blood money from arms sales to Ukraine over the past two or more years. If there is peace, then, again, their private sector will make a lot of money rebuilding war-torn Ukraine, and the money will come from their governments in the form of loans to Ukraine. Ultimately, the latter and its people will suffer for many years to come, and additional IMF aid packages will allow them to ensure minimal subsistence costs.

Yes, Ukraine has a long list of exported goods that could guarantee an increase in their export earnings in a more peaceful neighboring environment, as in the pre-war period. This might limit the cause for concern, but concerns about foreign debts accumulated through war and peace will continue to be a concern. It will be no less for Russia, which will have to shoulder all the bills from its own pocket. There may not be any periodic underwriting of expenses, which could result in the country’s economy taking an even bigger hit. Who cares?

Transatlantic gap

In going to war, Putin had to consider the possibility of a transatlantic gap that he had to allow to grow. This was already evident when France, for example, reacted strongly to Australia’s cancellation of the existing non-nuclear submarine deal after secretly signing a nuclear sub-deal with the US and the two countries forming the AUKUS security apparatus, which also included the UK.

Germany, another continental power, played a neutral role in the war in Ukraine as long as its concerns about the loss of Russian oil persisted. Once it had dealt with this problem one way or another, its fears of being seen as caring and courageous towards continental Europe took over. Today, both France and Germany have their own plans for the Indo-Pacific, as does Canada, which is miles away from the center of gravity of such a design.

Today, thanks to Russia and the war in Ukraine, the transatlantic gap has been bridged. There is also the inescapable reality that, following a series of new recognitions in the post-Cold War era, US influence in NATO has increased, especially when it comes to the number of small European countries feeding from its hand. Thus, the resurgence of any France or Germany, or the unimaginable and inevitable Franco-German initiative to seize power where the US might withdraw, looks remote. Any peacemaker in the context of the war in Ukraine will have to take these developments into account, no matter how futuristic they may sound now, if they are to make progress.

The writer is a political analyst and political commentator based in Chennai. The views expressed in the article above are personal and belong solely to the author. They do not necessarily reflect the views of Firstpost.