Why Central Asia should be on Donald Trump’s national security agenda

Shortly before he was named President-elect Donald Trump’s national security adviser, Rep. Mike Waltz (R-Fla.) called for sanctions on Russia to end Moscow’s war against Ukraine. He believes that flooding the world market with American oil and gas will lead to a decline in world energy prices and weaken Moscow’s military machine.

While such a strategy would take a year or two to achieve its desired effect, the Trump administration could take immediate steps to undermine Moscow’s ability to circumvent existing trade sanctions, especially in strategic regions such as Central Asia.

Sandwiched between Russia and China, Central Asia is not only subject to influence from both neighbors, but has also acted as a transit corridor for sanctioned Western goods to Russia since its invasion of Ukraine. One state, Kyrgyzstan, even appears to have prioritized the development of new financial mechanisms to circumvent financial restrictions on payments to and from Russia.

The Trump administration could re-establish the US as a more significant player in Central Asia and use this as leverage over Moscow and Beijing on strategic priorities in Ukraine, the Middle East and Taiwan. Washington’s involvement in Central Asia has declined under the Biden administration, especially after the chaotic withdrawal from Afghanistan.

Since the 1990s, Washington has wielded significant influence in Central Asia, making multibillion-dollar investments in Kazakh oil, gas and minerals. After 9/11, the region became central to US national security interests, with air bases at Karshi in Uzbekistan and Manas in Kyrgyzstan serving NATO troops in Afghanistan.

However, recent U.S. foreign direct investment (FDI) in the region has been modest at best. Aid to the five post-Soviet Central Asian countries (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan) fell from $435 million in 2012 to $226 million in 2023. Ukraine was growing rapidly. At the same time, China has committed billions of dollars to the region through its Belt and Road Initiative, including $500 million in grants, and offered generous loans, with some countries now owing Beijing more than half of their sovereign debt.

While Russia’s invasion of Ukraine was expected to weaken its influence in Central Asia, nearly three years after the war began, Moscow is seeking to tighten its control. In some Central Asian countries, remittances from migrant workers in Russia still account for 20 to 50 percent of GDP. Russia is ramping up its multibillion-dollar energy projects, from electricity exports and gas transit to new nuclear reactors in Uzbekistan, further increasing the region’s dependence on Moscow. Helping Russia evade sanctions has also become a lucrative business for the regional elite.

A prime example is Kyrgyzstan, once hailed by Washington as a “beacon of democracy” in Central Asia, with its fragile but relatively fair and competitive political system. But the great promises that Kyrgyzstan made have now faded. The US military was forced out of the country in 2014, and Kyrgyzstan is considered a satellite state of Moscow, with a semi-autocratic regime helping the Kremlin evade sanctions.

Since the beginning of 2022, when members of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) stopped direct trade with Russia, Kyrgyzstan has miraculously seen an unprecedented 1,026 percent increase in imports from the EU, and the volume of cargo transported within the country has increased by 29.7 percent compared to Happy 2021. The main sanctions-busting business scheme involves fictitious imports or “false invoicing,” in which Kyrgyz companies order goods that were never intended to physically arrive in the country and are promptly resold to Russian buyers or “lost” in transit.

Last year, the US Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned several Kyrgyz companies found to be facilitating sham transactions. Earlier this year it threatened to impose sanctions on Kyrgyz banks that work with Russian counterparts and facilitate payments for illicit foreign trade. In a May interview with Russian state television, Kyrgyz Prime Minister Akylbek Japarov, who has previously said he is not afraid of sanctions, responded to a question about his political reaction to international restrictions imposed on Russia’s financial sector by saying: “We should just get ahead of all these sanctions , all these permissions, prohibitions and so on. That is, we need financial technology companies that provide timely transfers and settlements between our countries.”

These were not idle speculations. In September, Kyrgyz authorities introduced a “year-long ban” on banking transactions for export-import payments by or for private firms when goods or services are not physically imported into the country. The government created the state-owned “Trading Company of the Kyrgyz Republic”—essentially a monopoly export-import operator—to handle such transactions for a “modest” commission of 2–6 percent. Experts expect the company to use the country’s two largest state-owned banks, Aiyl and Eldik, as well as the newly registered private bank Asman, which has ties to Russia, to facilitate payments through alternative national currencies and cryptocurrencies. None of the institutions mentioned responded to the author’s requests for comment on their sanctions enforcement practices. Local experts warn that flagrant non-compliance could trigger a wave of secondary sanctions, potentially leading to Kyrgyzstan’s financial isolation and loss of access to international financial markets.

While secondary sanctions, including personal punishments against officials either openly engaging in sanctions evasion or openly advocating it, are important, they are unlikely to be sufficient. The regional political and business elite must see a strong alternative to Russia and China. Offering economic incentives that can compete with the carrots of Beijing and Moscow while strengthening security cooperation is essential for the United States to regain its strategic foothold in Central Asia.

Given the capital-intensive nature of natural resource development (remarkable potential in this region), this may require significant investment. However, it would still be a small fraction of what the United States currently allocates to Europe and the Middle East. The Trump administration must signal that America is back in the region—and this time in earnest.

Margarita Assenova is a senior fellow at the Jamestown Foundation. She is a regular contributor to the Jamestown-based Eurasia Daily Monitor, covering political and energy security developments in the Balkans and Central Asia. Follow her on X: @M_Assenova.

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